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Introduction 
 
Back to Square One 
Fighting Resumes in South Sudan 
Annette Weber 
The conflict in South Sudan flared up again on the fifth anniversary of independence. 
After almost two years of war between forces controlled by President Kiir and those 
of Vice-President Machar, the latter had only recently – in April 2016 – returned to the 
capital Juba with his ministers and some of his troops to form a Transitional Govern-
ment of National Unity, together with Kiir’s cabinet. But both sides obstructed imple-
mentation of the August 2015 peace agreement, and repeated breaches of the cease-fire 
were reported in other parts of the country. On 7 July shooting broke out between the 
opposing forces in Juba. More than three hundred people died in the following days. 
In the meantime, Machar and his forces have left Juba and his chief negotiator Taban 
Deng Gai was installed as his replacement by President Kiir, splitting the leadership 
of the SPLM in Opposition. The question now is the fate of the peace agreement and the 
legitimacy of the two leaders. The United Nations has more than 13,000 troops on the 
ground, and the African Union is preparing an intervention mission to enforce peace. 
 
The power struggle between President Salva 
Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar continues 
unabated. A falling out in April 2013 esca-
lated into civil war by December. In August 
2015 the two sides signed the Agreement 
on the Resolution of the Conflict in South 
Sudan (ARCISS), negotiated under the 
auspices of the regional organisation IGAD 
(Intergovernmental Authority on Develop-
ment). IGAD and AU act as guarantors for 
the agreement; the UN, European Union, 
United States, United Kingdom, Norway 
and China are witnesses. The agreement 
was preceded by demands for democratisa-
tion, accusations of an attempted coup, the 
violent deaths of more than fifty thousand 
South Sudanese (largely civilians) and the 
displacement of more than two million. 
The first weeks of power-sharing were 
already difficult. Both sides portrayed the 
peace agreement as an instrument of con-
trol by the international community and 
exhibited little commitment to it. Two days 
before the outbreak of fighting in July 2016, 
Vice-President Machar and his chief of staff 
General Simon Gatwech Dual claimed that 
the international community had lured 
them into a trap. President Kiir in turn 
stated in an interview on the anniversary 
of independence on 9 July that the peace 
agreement, which he said he had never 
wanted, treated him and his government 
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as little children. Defence Minister Kuol 
Manyang complained that the internation-
al community was not committed enough 
to implementation of the peace agreement. 
Current Situation 
At first the 7 July 2016 clashes appeared to 
be no more than a random discharge of 
tensions in the city. But the next day’s 
fighting was most definitely an exchange 
between the armed forces of President Kiir 
and Vice-President Machar. Helicopters and 
tanks were deployed, and two Chinese UN 
peacekeepers died in an attack on their 
armoured vehicle. UN camps, where many 
of the more than 40,000 displaced persons 
had sought refuge, were also attacked. 
Fighting was also reported from the Equa-
toria region, while the Nuer “White Army” 
militia is said to be gathering in Jonglei 
state. The armed groups in these two parts 
of the country are close to Vice-President 
Machar. After Kiir called on 11 July for a 
cease-fire and demilitarisation, Machar is 
reported to have left Juba with his troops. 
Most foreigners were evacuated, but South 
Sudanese men were prevented from leaving. 
On 23 July Riek Machar was replaced by 
Taban Deng Gai, just one day after he was 
dismissed from the party. This is thus a 
highly contested political manoeuvre split-
ting the SPLM-IO leadership. 
The recent fighting has created an 
alarming humanitarian situation. Almost 
two million people, one fifth of the popu-
lation, are displaced, with almost half 
the population reliant on food aid. Many 
receive nothing, as armed groups prevent 
access to those in need. 
The causes of the conflict are the strug-
gle for sole power and for control over 
(currently meagre) oil revenues. The poli-
tical leaderships on both sides are playing 
the zero-sum game of kleptocratic clien-
telism. To mobilise their ethnic followings 
and stoke the confrontation they dissemi-
nate hate propaganda and extermination 
threats. Even traditional conflict mediators 
like councils of elders and representatives 
of the church have been stirring ethnic 
resentment. 
President Kiir changed the constitution 
by decree, tripling the number of states and 
thus deepening ethnic rifts. Where trust in 
society has been so thoroughly demolished, 
a new start will be difficult. Neither of the 
parties shows any genuine interest in im-
plementing the peace plan. Expressions of 
regret or responsibility to the traumatised 
population are rare. Regional and inter-
national actors, like neighbouring coun-
tries and international donors, find their 
efforts stymied by frustration, regional 
power struggles and conflicts of loyalties. 
They have watched their ability to urge the 
country’s political leadership to implement 
the peace agreements slip away. 
Challenges 
None of the country’s massive structural 
problems has been resolved. There is no 
functioning infrastructure of state institu-
tions, nor does the state generated an in-
come that could secure its existence. Basic 
Services are mainly outsourced to inter-
national organisations. The oil price will 
remain low in the medium term. When it 
became independent, South Sudan was still 
classed as a middle-income country. Per 
capita GDP in 2011 was $1,696, five times 
Ethiopia’s and three times Uganda’s. But 
state revenues were neither saved nor in-
vested, and flowed instead into the pockets 
of corrupt civil servants and military pro-
curement. 
Implementation of the peace agreement 
is practically non-existent. Festus Mogae, 
chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evalua-
tion Commission (JMEC), has since January 
2016 repeatedly called on the parties to 
make progress on implementation – with-
out effect. Elections in 2018 are, however, 
under discussion. 
Under the peace agreement six working 
groups were set up under the auspices of 
JMEC. The Monitoring and Verification 
Mechanism comprises thirty-two members, 
including representatives of the govern-
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ment (SPLM/A-IG) and the opposition 
(SPLM/A-IO), former party and cabinet mem-
bers arrested when the war broke out in 
2013, and representatives from other poli-
tical parties, South Sudanese civil society, 
neighbouring countries and the inter-
national community. 
Appeals by the UN Security Council and 
the JMEC working group for the Ceasefire 
and Transitional Security Arrangement 
Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) to both 
parties in the transitional government to 
observe the cease-fire and make a start with 
implementation of the peace agreement 
have to date fallen on deaf ears. After the 
latest clashes, that prospect seems even 
more remote. 
Human Rights 
The legacy of war crimes represents anoth-
er urgent problem. Human rights organisa-
tions, UN and AU all agree that war crimes 
and crimes against humanity have been 
committed by both sides in South Sudan, 
under control of their leaders Salva Kiir and 
Riek Machar. Even after the peace agree-
ment was signed, armed clashes persisted 
in many parts of the country. The practice 
of impunity comes cloaked in the rhetoric 
of reconciliation. But a supposed reconcilia-
tion process without attribution of respon-
sibility for human rights violations would 
cement the “two-class system” in South 
Sudan: Those who hold the weapons pos-
sess the power – and stand above the law. 
Economic Situation 
In order to fund his war, Kiir’s government 
borrowed hundreds of millions of dollars 
from foreign oil companies operating in 
the country. Their repayment will place a 
great burden on the state budget in coming 
years. The war was financially expensive 
and the loss of trust among the interna-
tional community will have repercussions 
for future cooperation. As well as targeted 
sanctions imposed on individuals, the 
donor community has also agreed to with-
hold budget finance and introduce a strict 
control and monitoring system. All these 
measures hurt the clientelist economy. The 
governing party SPLM/A-IG had placed its 
hopes above all in the International Mone-
tary Fund. By agreeing to the IMF’s com-
prehensive catalogue of demands, it had 
hoped to persuade donors to restart the 
flow of funds. The opposition party 
SPLM/A-IO, on the other hand, rejected 
the IMF’s demands, speculating that the 
government’s economic collapse would 
improve its own chances of gaining power. 
But now that most embassies have closed 
and IMF staff have left the country, the 
talks are unlikely to resume any time soon. 
What Needs to Happen? 
After the renewed outbreak of violence and 
Machar’s withdrawal from Juba it is hard to 
imagine a return to business as usual. The 
IGAD states’ call for an immediate cease-fire 
was certainly necessary, but implementa-
tion of the peace agreement has become 
impossible for the foreseeable future. 
The leadership’s legitimacy is in question. 
The priority now is ending the fighting, to 
prevent a conflagration and a further frag-
mentation of fighting units. But with Vice-
President Machar no longer in Juba and 
President Kiir rejecting UN and AU peace-
keepers, joint moves are unlikely. In order 
to prevent further war crimes, the region 
should commit to acting collectively. Uni-
lateral moves by neighbouring countries 
would only exacerbate the situation.  
To protect the civilian population, the 
UN’s South Sudan-Mission (UNMISS) needs 
to be strengthened and provided with a 
mandate under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. On the political level it is impera-
tive that respected South Sudanese leaders 
persuade the fragmented armed groups not 
to expand the fighting. In the medium term 
support needs to be channelled above all 
to those authorities working for peaceful 
resolution. 
Further, the entire international commu-
nity should massively step up its pressure 
SWP Comments 36 
July 2016 
4 
on South Sudan’s political class, and imme-
diately impose an arms embargo and direct 
financial sanctions. The prospects are rea-
sonable, as China would not oppose such 
measures in the Security Council after the 
attack on its peacekeepers, and Russia has 
also indicated that it would be willing to 
relax its anti-sanctions line in this case. The 
threat of excluding South Sudan from IGAD 
and AU would also send a message to the 
country’s elites that they cannot simply 
return to the status quo ante. 
Three development scenarios are con-
ceivable for South Sudan:  
Further fragmentation, as in Somalia or 
Libya, is the most likely outcome. Resources 
would be shared among the top leaders and 
increasing numbers of small groups would 
take up arms to secure their share of these 
dwindling resources. For lack of alterna-
tives IGAD and the international commu-
nity would support the remaining actors in 
the government of national unity. 
A protectorate of some form would be 
highly unrealistic. In the short term those 
responsible for the war crimes of recent 
years would have to resign or be forced out 
by a UN resolution. Financial flows would 
be externally controlled and the interna-
tional community would take charge of 
political, economic and military decisions. 
This scenario is unlikely to come about, 
because neither the UN nor any other orga-
nisation would be willing or able to carry 
through such an intervention. Such a pro-
posal has a strong colonial resonance and 
has already sparked angry reactions from 
South Sudanese. 
A gradual transformation of kleptocratic 
clientelism would be more sustainable and 
therefore the best solution. As in the second 
scenario, those responsible for war crimes 
would have to be forced out without delay. 
Transformation would require long-term 
engagement. The international donor 
community and neighbouring countries 
should avoid rehabilitating elites opposed 
to reforms. Instead they should direct their 
attention above all to areas like anti-corrup-
tion and budget distribution and improve 
the situation of the population. State-
building and stabilisation can only succeed 
in the long term if the good of the popula-
tion shifts to centre-stage of politics in Juba. 
Only if the citizens of South Sudan learn 
that they can join in shaping their state 
and society without suffering violence will 
the transformation of the elites towards 
public service and responsibility be success-
ful. And that cannot be accomplished from 
outside. 
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